Rodney J. Paul

This study extends the research on atmospheric conditions and scoring in sporting events by examining components of air density as it relates to National Football League (NFL) games. Statistically significant results were found in relation to the role of humidity in explaining the difference between actual scoring and the betting market total for NFL games. Simple wagering strategies based on humidity, wind speed, and a combination of these factors were shown to reject market efficiency. From game statistics, it appears that humidity may unexpectedly influence the rushing game, leading to...Read more

Brendan Dwyer
Rebecca M. Achen
and Joshua M. Lupinek

Basking in reflected glory (BIRGing) and cutting off reflected failure (CORFing) behaviors have been exhibited by sport spectators and measured by marketing researchers for decades. It has been established that these highly personal, yet socially focused reactions to team outcomes are fundamental components of the sport fan experience. The current study sought to extend this line of research by comparing fantasy footballrelated BIRGing and CORFing behavior to traditional NFL team-related behavior. An experience sampling method was utilized, and a sample of fantasy football participants was...Read more

David J. Berri
Martin B. Schmidt

Kickers in the NFL have two jobs. The first is kicking off. The second is scoring via field goal attempts and extra points. Of these two actions, the latter’s impact on outcomes is most easily observed. Decision-makers should be able to go beyond simple visual observation and evaluate actions in terms of their impact on outcomes. Consistent with past research in baseball and basketball, though, we find evidence that decision-makers undervalue the factor that is hardest to visually connect to outcomes.Read more

Stacey L. Brook
Aju J. Fenn

Much of the sport economics literature is able to demonstrate that teams have downward-sloping demand curves that imply market power, but there has been no formal test of this hypothesis. This paper provides an initial empirical test of market power for the NFL during the 1995 to 1999 seasons. We employ the price-cost margin methods under constant returns to scale as outlined by Neumann and Haid (1985) and Martin (1988).The two-stage least squares estimates, which control for the endogeneity of the price-cost margin and attendance as a percentage of total capacity, suggest that market...Read more

Stacey L. Brook

 Economists have been perplexed by the overwhelming evidence that sports teams set ticket prices in the inelastic range of spectator demand. In response, a number of profit-maximizing explanations have been proposed in the literature explaining why sports teams set ticket prices in the inelastic range of spectator demand, yet an evaluation of the proposed theories is missing. Therefore, using National Football League team data covering the 1995 through the 1999 seasons is employed to: a) determine if NFL teams do set ticket prices in the inelastic range of spectator demand...Read more

Matthew T. Brown
Daniel A. Rascher
Wesley M. Ward

During the past decade there has been a proliferation of sports stadia being built in America’s municipal districts. While it used to be common for the public to fully fund stadium construction projects, over the past 20 years factors such as political motives, tax reform, and increased public awareness of tax equity have forced sports teams to share increasing amounts of the financial burden (Crompton, Howard, & Var, 2003). As public funding for stadia construction has decreased, franchises have continued to strive for maximized profits. Concurrently, the cost of attending events in...Read more

Lisa Pike Masteralexis

The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in American Needle v. National Football League is not the “death knell” of collective licensing agreements in sports, but it will hold the NFL and other professional sports entities to a higher level of antitrust scrutiny than they had hoped. The issue in American Needle v. National Football League was whether the NFL’s collective licensing arm, NFL Properties, LLC (NFLP), was a single entity, and therefore, exempt from antitrust liability under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Section 1 deems “[e]very contract, combination in the form of a...Read more